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Holzer: Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and Judical

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
By: ChristinaE. Holzer'

INTRODUCTION
International investment in the United States promotes economic growth,
productivity, competitiveness, and job creation. It is the policy of the United
States to support unequivocally such investment, consistent with the protection
of the national security.

The monitoring of foreign direct investment ("FDI") 2 in the United States is a
balancing act between international relations and national security. The Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFlUS" or "the Committee") is tasked with
keeping the national security side of that balancing act in check.3 Prior to 2012, CFIUS had
never been a named defendant in any lawsuit.' However, as a committee, CFIUS has not
been granted a judicial review exemption by any statutory scheme. 5
This current status quo of exemption from judicial review will not stand
domestically in the long run for two reasons: (1) even with a statutory exemption, it impedes
the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA")6 presumption favoring judicial review;7 and (2)
questions of due process arise because CFIUS has neither a statute of limitations nor a time
bar on involuntary transaction reviews.8

* J.D. Candidate, 2014. For helpful and generous insight, I am grateful to my advisor and general font of
wisdom, Professor Julian Ku. I am also grateful to Hofstra's Journal of International Business and Law editors
Brian Boxler, Jennifer Walnick, and Alissa Piccione for their tireless precision. I thank Katrina Ozols and
Michael Hochfelsen for their invaluable feedback.
1 Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4667 (Jan. 25, 2008).
2 Historically, the United States has been one of the world's largest recipients of foreign direct investment. See,
e.g.,
Foreign
Direct
Investment, Net
Inflows (BoP, current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011).
4 See, e.g., Chinese Energy Developer Sues Communittee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)for
Blocking Oregon Wind-Farm Investment on National Security Grounds, VINsoN & ELKINS (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.velaw.com/resources/ChineseEnergyDeveloperSuesCFlUSBlockingOregonWindFarmlnvestment.a
spx.
' Id. It is the President alone who has been granted statutory exemption from judicial review on the action he
takes when advised by CFIUS. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (2011) ("The actions of the President ... and the
findings of the President . .. shall not be subject to judicial review.").
6 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2006).
See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1984); Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct.
1367, 1373-74 (2012) (split on other grounds).
8 See, e.g., Mark E. Plotkin ct al., CFIUS and Network Security Agreements, COVINGTON & BURLING, at 3
at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/f23cOc74-e76d-4993-acb5available
901415b8483f/Presentation/PublicationAttachmcnt/9138cc87-ccb3-44f7-80dc-99d6ccd0835d/oid45143.pdf
(last visited Dec. 12, 2013); EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN
DIRECT
INVESTMENT 37
(Inst.
for
Int'l
Econ.
ed.,
2006) available
at http://www.iic.com/publications/chaptersprevicw/3918/02iic3918.pdf.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CFIUS
CFIUS is an independent, inter-agency committee tasked with the oversight of FDI
in the United States.' While the need to monitor FDI has been at the forefront of Congress's
attention for much of the 20th Century,'o it was not until the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries' ("OPEC") oil embargo of the 1970s that the Ford Administration
empowered CFIUS to "monitor" the impact of FDI in the United States." Since then, the
CFIUS has rapidly evolved.
During the 1980s, two unsuccessful high-profile bids led to Congressional action,
exemplified by the Exon-Florio Amendment ["Exon-Florio"]. The first bid was spawned by
the attempted takeover of Goodyear Tire and Rubber by a British corporation.' 3 The second
bid came from a Japanese firm's attempted takeover of Fairchild Semiconductor

Corporation.14 Suddenly, the Ford Administration's empowerment to CFIUS to monitor,
review, and advise's was found by Congress to be woefully lacking. Subsequently, Senator
Exon and Representative Florio proposed Exon-Florio. 6
Under Exon-Florio, the process of review Was formalized and given standards.
The factors established for consideration were:
domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements,
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and
the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens
as affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the
requirements of national security.' 8

9

The

Committee

on

Foreign

Investment

in

the

US

(CFlUS),

U.S.

DEP'T

TREASURY,

http://www.treasury.gov/resource-centerlinternational/Pages/Committec-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
"o Prior to World War I, Germany had investments in, inter alia, the U.S. chemical industry deemed critical to
U.S. war efforts. Consequently, Congress acted quickly to protect U.S. interests by passing the Trading With
The Enemy Act and providing the President with broad powers to block and remove foreign investment. See,
e.g., GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra, note 8, at 38.
" See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975).
12 See Clyde Farnsworth, Petition Filed Opposing Offer to Buy Gold Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988,
http://www.nytimcs.com/1988/10/06/business/petition-filed-opposing-offer-to-buy-gold-ficlds.html;
accord
GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 8, at 145.
'3 See Denise Gellene, Goldsmith Drops Goodyear Bid, Will Sell Back His Stock, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1986,
http://articlcs.latimes.com/1986-II-21/business/fi-14781_Iltakeover-plan; see also Stuart Warner, A Good
Year
Remembered,
INSIDE
Bus.
MAG.,
Scpt.-Oct.
2011,

http://ibmag.com/Main/Archive/AGoodYear_Remembered_11967.aspx.
'4 See
Cold
Feet:
Fujitsu Drops
Its
Fairchild Bid,
TIME,
Mar.
30,
1987,
http://www.timc.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,963877,00.html.
" See 3 C.F.R. 990.
6 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011) (originally enacted as Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §
5021, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107).

" Id. § 2170(f)(1)-(3).
18 Id.

170
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President Reagan then issued an executive order that delegated the power of
performing a review to CFlUS and reporting the findings back to the President.' 9 The
executive order gave CFIUS thirty days after receipt of written notification to begin an
investigation and forty-five days to complete the investigation, which, while not a statute of
limitations, provided companies a predictable timeframe in the event that they chose to
submit voluntarily. As a result of the order, the President could make timely decisions on the
advice coming from the CFIUS-led investigation of national security issues, often from
forthcoming companies.
Despite the addition of Exon-Florio in 1988, CFIUS and the Office of the President
had ostensible difficulty defending and defining precisely what "national security" meant.
The ambiguity of the definition of national security, in part, led to the CATIC-MAMCO
episode. 2 '
In February of 1990, President George H. Bush, upon the advice of CFIUS, ordered
the rescission of the merger of the preceding November between the China National AeroTechnology Import and Export Corporation ("CATIC"), a Chinese governmental agency, and
the Seattle-based Mamco Manufacturing Inc ("MAMCO",). 2 2 While President Bush claimed
that his decision to void the transaction was based on national security concerns as
investigated by CFIUS, the Chinese government and CATIC declared the decision to be
retaliation for the killing of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square that previous June.2 3
The president of MAMCO explained to numerous news sources that MAMCO was
simply a machine shop with no classified contracts and no national security implications,
which only added to the speculation that the rescission may have been more about retribution
24
than national security.
As a result of the CATIC-MAMCO episode, Congress passed the Byrd Amendment
25
The
of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 ("Byrd Amendment").
Byrd Amendment contained three major additions to the Exon-Florio structure:
1. mandatory, 45-day investigation of any transaction involving state or sovereignowned entities which have the potential to affect national security,
2. elements 4 and 5 to Exon-Florio's 3 standards for a CFIUS review of a
transaction;
a. potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on sales of
military goods, equipment, or technology to any country identified .. . by
the Secretary of State, and

" See Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
Id.
21 See, e.g., Harriet King, China Ends Silence on Deal U.S. Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990,
Chinese Firm
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/20/business/china-cnds-silence-on-dcal-us-rescinded.html;
Protests Order to Sell Aircraft Parts Operation, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, http://articIes.latimes.com199002-20/busincss/fi-994 _aircraft-parts.
22 King, supra note 21.
20

23 Id.

Tom Brown, Manco: Victim Of China Anger? - Firm May Have Been Target Of Opportunity, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990, http://community.scattictimes.nwsource.com/archivc/?datc=19900206&slug=1054575;
see King, supra note 2 1.
25 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011) (originally enacted as National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993 § 837(a), Pub. L. No. 102-484 106 Stat. 2315).
24
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b. potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on United
States international technological leadership in areas affecting United
26
States national security.
CFIUS's new empowerment, which included the power to investigate any FDI
activity that potentially affected national security and required CFlUS to investigate all
transactions involving sovereigns or their entities, set the stage for the next series of FDI
episodes that were less about national security and more about national politics.
In the spring of 2005, Unocal Corporation was in the process of being purchased by
Chevron Corporation when China National Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOOC") made a
larger, unsolicited, all-cash bid for Unocal.2 7 This unexpected bid was immediately met with
so much negative Congressional reaction that the CEO of CNOOC wrote an open letter to
Congress, addressing its concerns through the media.
On top of the on-going CFIUS review, Congress added a provision to the 2005
Energy Policy Act that required a four-month study of Chinese energy needs. 29 Before
CFIUS completed its investigation, the negative publicity that resulted was so strong that
CNOOC withdrew its bid, and the less lucrative plan with Chevron went through. 30 Thus, one
result of the failed Unocal-CNOOC transaction was that Chinese entities publicly learned to
be more hesitant when getting involved with U.S. possibilities for FDI.3'
Soon after, in the autumn of 2005, Dubai Ports World ("DP World") announced its
intention to acquire a British company that had operation leases on six busy, American,
32
20,
a
DP World submitted its notification to CFIUS. On January 17, 2006, after an
ports.
investigation, CFlUS announced that the transaction was approved, provided that DP World
complied with mitigation agreements.
However, the public outcry34 and Congressional

26 Id.

§ 2170(b), (f)(4)-(5).

27 David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil Giant in Takeover Bid for U.S. Corporation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.con/2005/06/23/business/worldbusiness/23unocal.htm; see also
Aug.
3,
2005,
Bid,
XINHUA
NEWS
AGENCY,
CNOOC
Withdraws
Unocal
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Aug/137165.htm.
28 See Press Release, CNOOC Limited, Statement by Fu Chengyu, Chairman and CEO of CNOOC Limited
(June 24, 2005), available at http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/newszx/news/2005/958.shtml; Interview
With Fu Chengyu, TIME, July II, 2005, http://www.time.com/timc/magazinc/article/0,9171,1081436,00.html;
Is CNOOC's Bid for Unocal a Threat to America?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov. 21, 2005),
http://knowledgc.wharton.upenn.cdularticle.cfmarticlcid=1240.
29 H.R. Res. 6, 109th Cong. § 1837 (2005) (enacted).
3
CNOOC
Withdraws
Its
Bid
For
Unocal,
ASIA
TIMES,
Aug.
4,
2005,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GH04Ad02.html.
31 Sri Jegarahej, CNOOC's Failed Unocal Bid Paved Way for Nexen Deal, CNBC, July 24, 2012,
http://www.cnbe.com/id/48296409/CNOOC-sFailedUnocalBidPavedWayfor Nexcn Deal;
CNOOC
Withdraws Unocal Bid, ASIA TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.atimcs.com/atimes/China/GH04Ad02.html.
32David Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/ 10/politics/I Oports.html?pagewanted=all.
33 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security in the Dubai
Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-centcr/pressreleases/Pages/js407 1.aspx.
3 See, e.g., Key Questions About the Dubai Port Deal, CNN, Mar. 6, 2006, http://articles.cnn.com/2006-0306/politics/dubai.ports.qal dp-world-uac-dubai-port-deal.
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resistance , combined with the House Appropriations Committee's blocking of DP World's
36
ability to purchase access to critical ports, led to DP World abandoning all plans for U.S.
3
assets. ' The combination of the failed Unocal-CNOOC and DP World transactions were
seen as "suggesting a less hospitable business environment relative to the 1990s," leading to a
more hesitant approach for the holders of FDI interested in the United States.3 8
After DP World's abandonment, Congress was concerned that CFIUS investigations
were not transparent enough, which led the House to quickly pass the National Security
Foreign Investment Reform and Strengthened Transparency Act of 2007, overhauling CFIUS
operating procedures. 39
Once the National Security Foreign Investment Reform and
Strengthened Transparency Act passed in the House, it was retooled in the Senate as the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 ("FINSA"). 40
The passage of FINSA clarified the definition of "national security," added more
mandatory investigations, codified the mitigation process, and added to CFIUS's
Congressional reporting duties.4 ' The FINSA additions defined CFIUS's aggressive focus on
National Security.
Despite the amount of press CFIUS receives, the hard numbers reveal that extreme
measures are rarely taken. In 2009, 2010, and 2011, the Committee conducted 65, 93, and
Ill reviews, respectively, 4 2 as well as 25, 35, and 40 investigations, respectively. 43
Additionally, no transactions resulted in Executive action during this time period. 4 4
CFIUS STRUCTURE
CFIUS is designed for the single purpose of analyzing a narrow range of
transactions: covered transactions.4 5 Modern CFIUS has been through numerous structural
changes to meet that purpose since its amorphous beginning during World War 1.46 During
that period, the need to balance national security with allowing foreign entities to bid on U.S.

See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subconn. on Domestic and Int 7Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. Comm. on
Fin. Servi., 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- I 09hhrg3O179/html/CHRG- 109hhrg3O179.htm.
36 Dcidre
Walsh,
Congress Declares War on
Ports Deal, CNN,
Mar.
8,
2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/08/port.security/index.htmi.
3 Dana Bash, UAE Firm to Transfer Port Operations to 'U.S. Entity', CNN, Mar. 10, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/09/port.security/indcx.html.
" Christina V. Balis ct al., After Dubai Port: Rethinking M&A Strategy in a New Security Context, I I
available
at
ISSUE)
I,
31
(2006),
AVASCENT
REV.
(SPECIAL
http://www.avasccntinternational.com/Files/Publications/0606-TAR- II -Rethinking-MA-Strategics-in-a-NewSecurity-Context.pdf.
3 H.R. Res. 556, 110th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
4 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011) (originally enacted as Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246).
41 Id. § 2170(a)(5), (f)(11), (1),(m).
42 2012 CFIUS ANN. REP., at 1, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/forcigninvcstment/Documents/201 2%20CFIUS%2OAnnual%2OReport%20PUBLIC.pdf.
43 id.
3

45 50 U.S.C. app.

§ 2170(a), (b).

46 The first executive order outlining formal CFIUS structure came from President Truman during the Korean

Conflict. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975).
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assets, crystalized when the U.S. realized the German Empire was heavily invested in the war
production industry.47 While the influx of capital from foreign countries has benefits, foreign
capital originating behind enemy lines but being used to buttress critical war efforts is another
matter entirely.
Currently, the CFIUS Committee, guided by the Chairman and directed by the Lead
Agency follows its Congressional mandate by initiating a national security review ("Review")
with the possibility of a national security investigation ("Investigation") of covered
48
transactions. Upon completion of the Review and possible Investigation, CFIUS reports to
the President.49 Once CFIUS reports, the President can issue an Executive Order.50 Finally,
CFIUS reports to Congress both annually and on the basis of individual actions."
I. Covered Transactions
Transactions covered by CFIUS empowering documents are the core of what
CFIUS does. Specifically, the "covered transactions" CFIUS is empowered to analyze are
defined as "any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or pending after August 23,
1988, by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States."52
After August 23, 1988, CFIUS's mandate to review extends to any and all
transactions that involve the exchange of foreign capital for control over American assets that
have or may have any effect on American interstate commerce. Considering the reach of
"interstate commerce" as defined by U.S. federal judicial review,13 it is unlikely that foreign
investors will seek out American assets insubstantial enough to avoid "interstate commerce".
Since the Reagan Administration, CFIUS has been empowered to review any and all
transactions in the United States that led to foreign control of U.S. assets.
In theory, the CFIUS mandate that permitted the analysis of all covered transactions
is enormous; however, the practical application of CFIUS is minimal. For example, in 2010,
the FDI entering the United States totaled $194 billion.54 However, the number of notices
reviewed were ninety-three with thirty-five Investigations and no Presidential action.55 Thus,
as a practical matter, CFIUS reviews a small fraction of the FDI entering the United States.

4 GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra, note 8, at 4.
48 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a), (b) (2011).
4 Id. §2170(b)(1)(A).
'o Id. §2170(d).
* Id. § 2170(b)(3).
52 Id. § 2170(a)(3).
5 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that wheat grown on a farm for the personal use
of the farmer was under the scope of interstate commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S, 295 U.S.
495, 545 (1935) (holding that the methods of selection of poultry in local poultry markets was not under the
scope of interstate commerce).
5 ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INVESTMENT
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES

ESA ISSUE BRIEF #02-11, FOREIGN DIRECT
I
(2011),
at
available

http://www.esa.doc.gov/sitcs/dcfault/files/reports/documents/fdicsaissuebricfno2O614ll final.pdf.
" 2012 CFIUS ANN. REP., at 3, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-ccnter/intemational/foreigninvcstment/Documents/201 2%20CFIUS%2OAnnual%20Rcport%20PUBLIC.pdf.
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II. CFIUS Members
There are nine official committee members that make up CFIUS.1 The head of
CFIUS, the "Chairperson," is a position filled by the Secretary of the Treasury.5 7 The
Chairperson is obligated to determine which federal departments, agencies, and independent
establishments would be appropriate to consult with during the Review or Investigation of a
58
covered transaction.
The other voting members of the Committee are the:

I. Secretary of Homeland Security,
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of State,
Attorney General of the United States, and
Secretary of Energy.59

The nonvoting, ex officio members of the Committee are:
1. Secretary of Labor, and
2. Director of National Intelligence.'6
Beyond the nine official positions on the Committee, there is a provision to include
"the heads of any other executive department, agency, or office, as the President determines
appropriate, generally or on a case-by-case basis." ' Furthermore, there are four other offices
that regularly observe and participate. They are the:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Office of Management and Budget,
Council of Economic Advisors,
National Security Council, and
National Economic Council. 62

By statute, the only permissible delegation of Committee power by any of its
members during a Review or Investigation is to (1) the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, or
63
(2) "the deputy head (or the equivalent thereof) of the lead agency, respectively."
Consequently, while the Committee may be added to as needed, the Committee's core
members cannot shrink, under current legislation. All members will, most likely, be involved
in all Reviews and Investigations in at least a cursory manner.

16 Composition

of
CFIUS,
U.S.
DEP'T
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecentcr/intemational/forcign-invcstmcnt/Pages/cfus-members.aspx (last updatcd Dcc. 1, 2010).
5 Id.; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(1), (k)(3) (2011).
5 E.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(D)(i) (2011).
" Id. § 2170(k)(2)(A)-(G); Composition of CFlUS, supranotc 56.
6 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2)(H)-(I) (2011).
61 Id. § 2170(k)(2)(J).
62 Composition of CFIUS, supra notc 56.
63 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(D) (2011).
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CFlUS PROCESS
There are two steps that CFIUS, as a committee, has the authority to exercise in
order to carry out its mandate. The first step is that CFIUS reviews an FDI transaction.
Should the review process reveal that the FDI transaction involves a foreign government or
national security concerns, that Review must proceed to an Investigation. Once CFIUS has
completed either only a Review or a Review and subsequent Investigation, the Committee
must advise the President and report to Congress on its findings.
1. National Security Review
The Review process of covered transactions can occur one of two ways: partyinitiated or CFIUS-initiated.6 If one or more of the parties involved with the FDI transaction
voluntarily submit their transaction to CFIUS, they do so with a written notice of the
transaction to the Chairperson of CFlUS. 65 Even if none of the parties involved in the
transaction voluntarily submit their transaction to CFIUS, either the Committee or the
President may unilaterally initiate a Review of the covered transaction.66 At any point, a
Review may be repeated after the completion of the initial Review only should the materials
provided by any party during the initial Review be thought to be "false or misleading," if
there were material omissions in the materials provided, or if any party to the covered
transaction is found to be in breach of a relevant mitigation agreement.
As the Review period (distinct from an Investigation period ) shall, by statute, only
last up to thirty days, the advantage to voluntary submission is that the beginning of the thirtyday Review begins upon acceptance of the written notice.70 If none of the parties submit their
transaction for Review, the thirty-day Review period does not start until the Chairperson
initiates the Review.7 ' Failure to submit is a risky proposition because after "covered
transaction" reviews started in 1988,72 any transaction made thereafter, which qualified as
covered, was subject to both a Review and the possibility of complete unwinding.73
Therefore, the option of voluntary submission provides a faster and more reliable background
than waiting to see if the transaction ever gets the Committee's attention.
In a voluntary submission, one or more of the parties to the transaction completes a
Voluntary Notice to CFIUS pursuant to Section 721 of Title VII of the Defense of Production
Act of 1950.74 The Voluntary Notices require specific and detailed information regarding a

6
61

6
61

Id. § 2170(b)(1)(C), (D) (2011).
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(i).
Id. §2170(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii)-(iii).

68

Id.

69

Compare 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1) (2007), with id. § 2170(b)(2).
Id. §2170(b)(1)(E).

70

n1 Id.
72

Id.

§2170(a)(3).
J. Daly,

7 E.g., Nova

CFIUS' Biggest Hits: Lessonis for the Dealmaker, WILEY REIN LLP (Apr. 2010),
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp-articlcs&id=6023.
74 31 C.F.R. § 800.401 (2013); see, e.g., Voluntary Notice to the Committcc on Foreign Investment in the
United States under Section 721 of Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, and 31
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range of things, including: the financing of the transaction, business projections, recent
history of the entities involved, and any individuals with a significant role to play in the FDI
transaction.75 Any information that is false or misleading in the Voluntary Notice, or omitted
from the Voluntary Notice, negates the binding effect of a completed Review and allows
CFIUS to re-Review a covered transaction.
As further incentive for parties to fully and
openly comply, Voluntary Notices remain confidential and exempt from Freedom of
Information Act requests and will not be made public unless called for by either judicial or
administrative proceedings.n Once the Department of the Treasury has officially accepted
the Voluntary Notice and issued a Notice of Acceptance, the thirty-day time frame for CFIUS
to complete its Review begins. 78
The Director of National Intelligence must be given notice of the commencement of
a Review, as the Director of National Intelligence must provide CFIUS a "thorough analysis
80
of any threat to national security",79 no later than twenty days after the Notice of Acceptance.
Once the Director of National Intelligence has been given notice, the very first
determination that CFIUS must make is whether the transaction will result in control by a
foreign government.8 Section 721 defines "foreign government-controlled transactions" to
be "any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States by a foreign government
or an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government." 82 Transactions
involving foreign governments are, by default, cause for greater scrutiny under the mandate
set for CFIUS.
The proposition of ceding control of any portion of interstate commerce to either a
foreign government or a foreign-government-controlled entity on U.S. soil will automatically
shift the thirty-day Review into a forty-five-day Investigation by CFIUS.13 However, if the
transaction is going to result in private, foreign control, and does not involve a foreign
84
government, the thirty-day Review with a possibility of Investigation will continue.
During a CFIUS Review, the Chairperson first delegates a lead agency to spearhead
85
the Review. The lead agency during the Review of a transaction 86, :
shall... be the lead agency or agencies on behalf of the Committee-(A) for each covered transaction, and for negotiating any mitigation
agreements or other conditions necessary to protect national security; and

C.F.R. Part 800 with Respect to a Transaction between Ralls Corporation and Terna Energy USA Holding
Corporation, Ralls Corp. v. Obama, CFIUS & Gcithner, No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2012).
" 31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)-(c).
76 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii) (2011).

n Id. § 2170(c).
Id. §2170(b)(1)(E).
7 Id. § 2170(b)(4)(A).
SId. § 2170(b)(4)(B).
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B).
82 Id. § 2170(a)(4).
83 Id. § 2170(b)(1)(E), (2)(C).
14 Id. § 2170(b)(1).
6 Id. § 2170(k)(5).
1Id. 2170(a)(8).

71

177

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

(B) for all other matters related to the monitoring of the completed transaction,

to ensure compliance with such agreements or conditions and with this
.87
section.
For practical purposes, the lead agency is in charge of the minutia of any specific Review.
Once the lead agency is designated, the Committee may proceed with the Review.
In a Review, the Committee must consider ten generalized factors revolving
primarily around the short- and long-term viability and stability of U.S. economic, energy,
technology, and national security interests. 8 There is also a provision specifically tasked
with preventing terrorism.9
Beyond the eleven factors to consider, there is a catchall that provides for "such
other factors as the President or the Committee may determine to be appropriate, generally or
in connection with a specific [R]eview or [l]nvestigation." 9 1 Thus, if none of the ten other
categories are sufficient to cover what CFIUS may believe to be appropriate material to
assess, the Committee or the President are free to expand on the factors that ought to be
considered.
In addition, the lead agency is empowered to negotiate on behalf of the Committee
and enter into mitigation agreements during the Review.92 These negotiations and mitigation
agreements are constructed to address issues that arise when the Committee considers the
covered transaction against the framework of the prescribed factors.93
In situations where the private parties comply with mitigation agreements and allow
monitoring as prescribed, the Committee need only submit a certification to Congress and the
Congressional Member from the district of the new entity's principal place of business.94
Upon submission, the Review is over.95 An Investigation is triggered when mitigation
agreements are breached, government entities are involved, critical infrastructure is involved,
or the Review was deemed insufficient to address the issues raised.
Regardless of the path to Review completion, CFlUS is obligated to promptly
inform the parties of the results of the underlying covered transaction once the review has
ended."
II. National Security Investigation

A CFIUS Investigation is triggered in one of three circumstances, provided that the
lead agency recommended, and CFIUS agreed, that an Investigation should begin. The first
circumstance occurs when a national security threat found during the Review was not
" Id. § 2170(k)(5).
88 Id.

' Id. § 2170(0(1)-(8), (10).
9 Id. § 2170(f)(9).
9 Id. § 2170(f)( 1).
Id. § 2170(k)(5)(A).
9 Id. § 2170(1)(1)(A).
9 Id. § 2170(b)(3).
9 Id.
9 Id. § 2170(b)(2)(B).
" Id. § 2170(b)(6).
9' Id. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(ii).
92
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mitigated, either prior to the Review or through a mitigation agreement." The second
circumstance occurs if the transaction results in U.S. assets being controlled by a foreign
govemment.'" The third circumstance triggering an Investigation occurs if the transaction
involves the transfer of a U.S. asset that is deemed to be any form of "critical
infrastructure"' 0 without mitigations for the risk. 0 2
Unlike the Review period that can be triggered by the Committee's acceptance of a
party's writing, an Investigation begins "on the date on which the investigation
commenced.", 0 3 In other words, a CFIUS Investigation begins when it is called for and there
is nothing the parties can do to hasten or avoid its arrival. As soon as one of the three
instances occurs and CFIUS deems an Investigation appropriate, an Investigation is required.
Furthermore, an Investigation may begin only during a Review period but no written
notice is required from the Committee to the parties involved.' Not only is no written notice
needed from the Committee, but the Committee is further empowered with a much more
flexible mandate to "take any necessary actions in connection with the transaction to protect
the national security of the United States." 05 Therefore, while CFIUS is not required to
inform the parties of the beginning of an Investigation, at the completion of an. Investigation
CFIUS must provide prompt notice of the findings to the parties of the covered transaction.'0
III. Findings of the President

All Reviews and prospective Investigations performed by CFIUS are done on behalf
of the President.' 07 However, when extraordinary measures are required, it must be the
President-not the CFIUS Committee-that acts and does so on the advice of the Committee
through the power granted in Section 721.os
While the CFIUS Committee is permitted to take "any necessary actions in
connection with the transaction to protect the national security of the United States[,]"' 09 only
the President is explicitly granted the power "to suspend or prohibit any covered
transaction" "o and further to direct the Attorney General of the United States "to seek

9 Id. §2 1 70(b)(2)(B)(i)(1).
' Id. §2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(ll).
10Id. §2170(a)(6) ("Critical infrastructure means ... systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact
on national security.").
102Id. §2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(III).
103Id. § 2170(b)(2)(C).
'" Id. § 2170(b)(2).
'os Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A).
1o6 Id. § 2170(b)(6).
Id. §2170(b)(1)(A).
Id. §2170(d)(1), (c).
'* Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A).
"'0 Id. § 2170(d)(1).
0o

'o
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appropriate relief, including divestment relief' in federal courts.'
Moreover, only measures
and findings by the President are exempt from judicial review under Section 721.112
In order for the President to seek an appropriate action, including suspension or
prohibition of a covered transaction, the President must first make two findings.'13 First, there
must be "credible evidence" that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest
involved in the covered transaction "might take action" that "threatens to impair the national
security ..
114Second, all other provisions of law, aside from the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, must fail to provide "adequate and appropriate authority" to the
President to protect national security."'
An Executive Order containing these two findings must be announced no later than
fifteen days after the completion of the relevant Investigation." 6 Beyond those fifteen days,
Section 721 provides no authority for the presidential action.
IV. Reporting to Congress
CFIUS is required to provide Congress with certified notice after the completion of
each Review and a certified written report at the completion of each Investigation not
submitted to the President for further action. 1 The certified notice and reports must go:
1. to the Majority leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate;
2. to the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate and of any committee of the Senate having oversight
over the lead agency;
3. to the Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives;
4. to the chair and ranking member of the Committee on Financial Services of the
House of Representatives and any committee of the House of Representatives
having oversight over the lead agency; and
5. with respect to covered transactions involving critical infrastructure, to the
members of the Senate from the State in which the principal place of business of the
acquired United States person is located, and the member from the Congressional
8
District in which such principal place of business is located.''

".Id. § 2170(d)(3).
112 Id.

§ 2170(c) ("The actions of the President under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of this section and the

findings of the President under paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of this section shall not be subject to judicial

review.").
"3 Id. § 2170(d)(4).
114 Id. §2170(d)(4)(A).
.s Id. §2170(d)(4)(B).
116 Id. § 2170(d)(2).
"' Id. § 2170(b)(3)(A)-(B).
...Id. § 2170(b)(3)(C)(iii).
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These certifications to Congress include descriptions of the steps taken by CFIUS
and specify the determinative factors considered from Section 721.119 Furthermore, each
certification must be signed by the Chairperson and the head of the Lead Agency, certifying
the Committee's determination that the covered transaction had "no unresolved national
security concerns" in question.1 2 0
Beyond the certifications, CFIUS must also present an annual report to Congress of
all the Reviews and Investigations which transpired in the preceding twelve-month period.12'
Although the annual reports provide specific information, they provide a broader overview
than certifications, focused on "trend information." 2 2 Unlike the certifications, there must
also be an unclassified version of the annual report available to the public.' 2 3
JUDICIAL REVIEW

CFIUS may be subject to judicial review. While Congress exempted Presidential
findings and actions under Section 721 from judicial review,124 the Committee itself has not
been granted such an exemption.125 CFIUS is an administrative committee, binding it not
only to its various empowering statutes and executive orders,' 26 but also to the APA.127
Arguably, the structure of the Executive Committee lends itself to the notion that it
may not in fact be an executive agency. If CFIUS is not considered an executive agency, it
would not necessarily be subject to the APA. However, in the first case brought against
CFIUS, the federal government failed to rebut the pleading that CFIUS was governed by the
APA when the plaintiff pled "CFIUS constituted an 'agency' whose final actions are
reviewable under the APA", indicating a concession by the federal government that CFIUS is,
in fact, bound to the APA.128
Moreover, Section 721 is bereft of support for the contention that the Committee's
actions would be exempt from judicial review. In fact, there is language indicating
anticipatory judicial review of CFIUS:

§ 2170(b)(3)(C)(i).
Id. § 2170(b)(3)(C)(ii).
121 Id. §2170(m).
22 Id. §2170(m)(2).
"' Id

120

12 I/.
§ 2170(m)(3)(B); see, e.g., Reports and Tables, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
(last
http://www.treasury.gov/resourcc-ccntcr/intemational/foreign-investment/Pagcs/cfius-reports.aspx
updated Sept. 9, 2013).
124 See 50 U.S.C. § 2170(c) (2011).
125 See id. § 2170(c).
12 The legislation and executive orders have been codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011).
2' 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-60 (2006).
28 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 24, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv.
in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4931759, at 1 109.
Furthermore, in none of the defendants' papers in the Ralls case did the U.S. government raise any attempt to
counter the plaintiffs claim of an APA violation. Moreover, the U.S. government did move the district court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on claims of APA violations. Thus far, the U.S. government has implicitly
affirmed that CFIUS action is bound by the APA. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
RaIls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513ABJ), 2012 WL 5338791; Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss, RaIls Corp.
v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012
WL 5945531.
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Any information or documentary material filed with the President or the President's
designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552
of title 5, United States Code [5 U.S.C.A. § 552], and no such information or
documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any
administrative or judicial action or proceeding.129
Although the statutory language does not specify CFIUS as a prospective party
within the judicial action or proceeding, or as a non-party witness on the outer boundaries of
the judicial action or proceeding, the statute does not rule out the possibility of CFIUS as a
party to the judicial action or proceeding.
Alternatively, the largest indicator that CFIUS is subject to judicial review is the
silence of the statute. While the statute explicitly states that the President is immune from
judicial review when taking action under framework of Section 721, CFlUS is never granted
statutory immunity from judicial review. Subsection E-entitled "Actions and Findings
Nonreviewable"-of Section 721, states, in its entirety, "[t]he actions of the President under
paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of this section and the findings of the President under
paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review. 3 0
The extent of the President's immunity, as stated in "Actions and Findings
Nonreviewable[,]" is that the President's actions, as authorized within the parameters of
Section 721, are nonreviewable."' The fact that Congress went so far as to grant the
President immunity from judicial review, while remaining silent on the CFIUS Committee
itself, is a strong indicator that Congress never intended to grant the CFIUS Committee
immunity.
Moreover, the absence of CFIUS's reviewability under Section 721, combined with
the following provision of the APA, provides strong evidence that CFIUS is likely subject to
judicial review. The section of the APA entitled "Right of Review" states:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicialreview thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other
than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee
thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against

the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.132
Thus, if a member of CFIUS, who is both a member of the CFIUS Executive Committee and
a member of another administrative agency, 3 3 steps beyond the scope of granted authority in
Section 721, the APA indicates that judicial review is available to the injured party.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the APA creates "a presumption
favoring judicial review of administrative action."
The Supreme Court further determined

50 U.S.C. app. §2170(c) (2011) (emphasis added).
"o Id. §2170(c).
129

131

Id.

131

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (emphasis added).
50 U.S.C. §2170(k)(2) (2011).
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348-49

'3

13
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that the APA only creates a presumption, of judicial review that "may be overcome by
specific language"13 1 or overcome by "inferences of [Congressional] intent drawn from the
statutory scheme as a whole." 36
To that point, CFIUS was formed almost four decades ago and has seen three,
high-profile Congressional overhauls.' Accordingly, the matter of judicial review exemption
was not overlooked.' 39 Exemption from judicial review was expressly granted to the
President alone.140 Over the past four decades, with considerable input from Congress, the
Committee has only been empowered to make public relevant information, should the
Committee be involved in a judicial proceeding or action. 141 Therefore, Congress did not
intend for the Committee to be exempt from judicial review.
UNCHARTED WATERS: RALLS V. CFIUS
On September 12, 2012, the Rails Corporation ("Rails") filed a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief against CFIUS and Timothy Geithner, in his official capacity
as Secretary of the Treasury and CFIUS Chairperson, in the United States District Court in
Washington, D.C.14 2 This complaint was the first legal challenge to a CFIUS action in the
agency's history.143 Customarily, foreign entities withdraw their bids for U.S. assets when
CFIUS gives them a negative review,14 4 and none have ever sought judicial review of CFIUS
action.1
Rails asserted that the District Court had jurisdiction over the claim,'4 6 and,
therefore that the claim could be reviewed by the courts on the grounds of: (1) federal
question 4 7 and (2) creation of a remedy.i14 Given the silence in Section 721 on the

" Block, 467 U.S. at 348-49.
132 S.Ct. at 1369.
"n Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975).
'3 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2011) (originally enacted as Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 §
5021, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107); id. (originally enacted as National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993 § 837(a), Pub. L. No. 102-484 106 Stat. 2315); id. (originally enacted as Foreign Investment
and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246).
"9 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(c) (2011).
136 Sackett,

1o Id.
141

Id. §2170(c).

142 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 626

F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646.
143E.g., Gary Beihn ct al., What Foreign Investors Can Learn from President Obana s Prohibition of Ralls
2012),
(Dec.
19,
WILLIAMS
LLP
WHITE
&
Acquisition,
Corporations
http://www.whitcandwilliams.com/resources-alerts-What-Foreign-Invcstors-can-Learn-from-PresidentObamas-Prohibition-of-Ralls-Corporations-Acquisition.html.
'4 E.g., Sara Forden & Tom Schoenberg, Chinese-Owned Ralls Corp. Sties U.S. Over Wind-Farn Order,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-13/chinese-owned-ralls-corp-sucs-u-s-over-wind-farm-ordcr.html.
'4 Bcihn et al., supra note 143.
46 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Rails Corp. v. Committec on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,
626 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:1 2-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at $ 5-6.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2007).
14 Id.

220 1.
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Committee's judicial reviewability beyond that which exempted the President, the
presumption of reviewability of the Committee was in line with the APA and Section 721.149
I. Original Complaint

In the original complaint, filed on September 12, 2012, Rails asserted an APA
violation and a Constitutional violation.so Rails claimed CFIUS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by operating beyond the scope of its empowerment, thereby violating the
APA.15 1
Rails' claim that CFlUS violated the APA by acting beyond the scope of its
authority was meritorious. Moreover, the argument was two-pronged. The first argument
was that the Committee potentially acted beyond the scope of its authority when it issued an
"Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures" on July 25, 2012 ("July Order").' 52 The
July Order terminated all of Rails' construction, operations, and access at all properties and
required the removal of all of Rails' items at all properties. 5 3 The second argument was that
CFIUS likely overextended its power when it issued an "Amended Order Establishing Interim
Mitigation Measures" ("August Order"), on August 2, 2012.154 The August Order added
restrictions to the July Order, forbidding sales of any items made by Rails' parent Chinese
Company to any third party.'55 Additionally, the August Order forbade the sale of the
properties or assets to any third party without the consent of CFIUS.'56
II. The July Order

The July Order invoked the Committee's mitigation power under an Investigation.
The July Order includes the language "there are national security risks to the United States
that arise as a result of the Transaction."' 5 Section 721 subparagraph B, under the subheading
"Mitigation, tracking, and postconsummation monitoring and enforcement" ("Mitigation
Subheading") states: "Any agreement entered into or condition imposed under subparagraph
(A) shall be on a risk-based analysis, conducted by the Committee, of the threat to national
15
security of the covered transaction."
8 This language makes it apparent that the Committee

was invoking the power provided in the Mitigation Subheading.
Invoking the authority provided in the Mitigation Subheading provides the
Committee several powers, but two constraints on those powers are pertinent to this issue:

E.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 34849(1984).
'o Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,
626 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:1 2-CV-01 513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at 2.
149

''

Id.

152 Id. at
'5

943.

Id.

154 Id. at

50.

"' Id. at 952.
56 Id.

...Id. at

44.

" 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(1)(1)(B) (2011) (emphasis added).
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timing and broader language. First, the language used to apply the Mitigation Subheading to
the transaction changes the Review into an Investigation. 159
[An Investigation] shall apply in each case when the transaction would result in

control of any critical infrastructure of or within the United States by or on behalf
of any foreign person, if the Committee determines that the transaction could impair
national security, and that such impairment to national security has not been
mitigated by assurances provided or renewed with the approval of the Committee,
as described in [the Mitigation Subheading] of this section, during the [R]eview
period ... .160

By changing the Review into an Investigation, the Committee is granted forty-five days from
the date of Investigation commencement to continue analysis.' 6 ' CFIUS accepted Ralls'
162
16
written notification on June 28, 2012
and issued the July Order on July 25, 2012,
indicating the latest start date of a forty-five day Investigation" with two days left on the
Committee's thirty-day limit of a Review. 65 By issuing the July Order, the Committee had
an additional forty-five days to complete their analysis.
Second, by invoking the language in subparagraph B of the Mitigation Subheading,
the authority of subparagraph A is triggered. Subparagraph A provides:
The Committee or lead agency may on behalf of the Committee, negotiate, enter
into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party to the
covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national security of the
66
United States that arises as a result of the covered transaction.
Subparagraph A broadened the scope of the Committee's authority from reviewing submitted
materials in the light of eleven factors16 7 to wielding the power to make "any agreement or
condition" the Committee deems necessary.'16 Therein lies the question: What is meant by
the word "any" under the context of mitigation?
The Mitigation Subsection'6 9 is distinct from the subsection entitled "Action by the
President."1 7 0 Although the Mitigation Subsection discusses permissible methods to mitigate
threats to national security, it does not explicitly grant the power to "suspend" or "prohibit"
any covered transaction. 7' The only power to suspend or prohibit a covered transaction,

"' Id. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(lll).
'6 Id. (emphasis added).
161 Id. § 2170(b)(2)(C).
62 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 5, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign
Inv.
in the U.S., 626 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2013 WL 1334728.
63 id.
'6 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(C) (2011).
'65 Id. § 2170(b)(1)(E).
Id. § 2170(l)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
61 Id. § 2170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
6'

Id. § 2170(1)(1)(A).

69 Id. § 2170(l)(1).
70

Id. § 2170(d).

'.'
Compareid.

§ 2170(1)(1), with id. § 2170(d)(1).
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under Section 721, is found in the subsection, "Action by the President," which states, "the
President may take such action for such a time as the President considers appropriate to
suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of
the United States." 7 2
The July Order stated that Rails, inter alia:
Shall immediately cease all Construction and Operations, and shall not undertake
any further Construction and Operations, at the Properties;
Shall remove all stockpiled or stored items from the Properties no later than July
30, 2012, and shall not deposit, stockpile, or store any new items at the Properties;
and
Shall immediately cease all access, and shall not have any access, to the
.173
Properties.
Ceasing all construction, operations, and access to the property Rails' purchased may fall
under the umbrella of "any" methods for mitigation, but it could just as easily fall under the
President's powers of suspension and prohibition. Accordingly, that further begs the question:
what is meant by the word "any" under the context of mitigation? Additionally, whether or
not the mitigation power allows the Committee to halt so many of Rails' property rights
remains unanswered. The answers to these questions become the key for establishing subject
matter jurisdiction over the Committee in this matter under the APA.
As the APA states: "An action in a court of the United States seeking relief...
stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act... under
color of legal authority shall not be dismissed .... " In the instant case, if the Mitigation
Subsection does grant the Committee explicit presidential powers, then the court has no
subject matter jurisdiction. However, if the Mitigation Subsection's usage of the word "any"
is exclusive of presidential powers, then subject matter jurisdiction is established through the
APA, and the Committee may have stepped beyond its authority. These questions aside, the
Court ultimately found this issue to be moot, because the July Order was replaced by the
August Order, which in turn was repealed by the Executive Order.' 75

III. The August Order
On August 2, 2012, CFIUS issued the second order: the August Order. In the
August Order, CFIUS reaffirmed the restrictions of the July Order, but added that Rails:
Shall not sell or otherwise transfer or propose, or otherwise facilitate the sale or
transfer to any third party for use or installation at the Properties of any items made
or otherwise produced by [Rails' Chinese parent company]

50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2011).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,
626 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1: 12-CV-01 513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at l 45.
"1 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
's See Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 626 F. Supp. 2d 71, 79-80 (D.D.C. 2012).
72

"'
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Shall not complete a sale or transfer of the Project Companies or their assets to anty
third party until:
All items deposited, installed, or affixed (including concrete foundations) on
the Properties subsequent to the acquisition by Ralls of the Project Companies
have been removed from the Properties;
the Companies notify CFIUS of the intended recipient or buyer;
the Companies have not received an objection from CFIUS within 10 business
days of notification. 76
The August Order not only reaffirmed the previous issues of exerting explicit presidential
powers by the Committee, but also provoked new complications.
The exertion of authority that is most questionable with regard to the August Order
was the control CFIUS attempted to exert over sales or transfers to any third party. Under
Section 721, CFIUS is empowered to review "covered transactions," which encompasses
transactions "which could result in foreign control" of U.S. assets.' 77 The term "any third
party" in the August Order did nothing to exclude wholly American parties, and, under
current legislation, CFlUS has no power to regulate what wholly American parties
purchase. 178

If Ralls-a Delaware Corporation with a Chinese parent company-had looked to sell
its assets to an American company with no foreign parent company, then that American third
party would fall beyond the scope of what CFIUS was empowered to consider. In fact, the
August Order was issued after Rails informed CFIUS that it had an American buyer that
could close within a week of July 31, 2012.179
CFIUS, in its current incarnation, is specifically designed to regulate U.S. assets
leaving U.S. control. It has not been empowered to regulate assets being added or returned to
U.S. control. Specifically, covered transactions concern transactions "which could result in
foreign control[,),',80 not transactions which could result in American control.
The August Order may have stepped beyond the boundaries of the power granted to
CFIUS by Section 721 by asserting power over any interested third party because the August
Order language is inclusive of American parties looking to purchase assets. As the APA
states, "An action in a court of the United States seeking relief . . . stating a claim that an
agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act . . . under color of legal
authority shall not be dismissed . . . .""' Thus, Rails' claim against CFIUS should have, and
82
did, survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1

1 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10-11, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the

U.S., 626 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at

52 (cmphasis

added).
'" 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added).
"' See id. § 2170.

17 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Ralls Corp. v. Committcc on Foreign Inv.
in the U.S., 626 F.Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4931759, at 82.
"so 50 U.S.C. app. §2170(a)(3) (2011).
1815 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
82 Ralls, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71.
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IV. Amended Complaint
On October 1, 2012, Rails filed an amended complaint to include President Barak
Obama, in his official capacity. 83 This amended complaint was filed in response to President
Obama's Executive Order entitled "Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm
Project Companies by Rails Corporation" ("September Order"), issued on September 20,
2012.184 In the September Order, the President not only invoked his power under Section
721, but also the power vested in the office by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act. 185
The text of this Executive Order fully complies with the requirements of Section
721 as laid out for the President in the subsection entitled "Findings of the President."'16
Section 721 permits the President "to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States" 8 7 only if the President finds
that:
(A) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign
interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national
security; and
(B) provisions of law, other than [Section 721] and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate
and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security in the
matter before the President. 188
The first paragraph of the September Order states, "There is credible evidence that leads me
to believe that Rails . . . might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the
United States."' 89 This establishes the first requirement for the President to suspend or
prohibit a covered transaction. The second paragraph of the September Order states,
"Provisions of law, other than [S]ection 721 and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act .. . do not, in my judgment, provide adequate and appropriate authority for me to
90 This recitation of the second requirement, as
protect the national security in this matter."
cited in Section 721, establishes the second piece of the President's power to suspend or
prohibit a covered transaction.
The September Order goes further than the cessation demanded in the Committee's
July and August Orders. The September Order divests Rails of "all interests in" the company,
83 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Rails Corp. v. Committce on
Foreign Inv. in the
U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4931759.
18 Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Rails Corporation, 77 Fed.
Reg. 60,281 (Sept. 28, 2012).
'" 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977); Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by
Rails Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,281 (Sept. 28, 2012).
86 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(4)
(2011).
...Id. § 2170(d)(1).
8 Id. § 2170(d)(4).

the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Rails Corporation, 77 Fed.
Reg. 60,281(Sept. 28, 2012).
189 Order Regarding
19 Id.
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the assets, intellectual property, technology, personnel, customer contracts, operations, and
access to the property.' 9'
Rails argued that this element of the September Order was problematic because,
much like the August Order, the Executive Order invoked the power provided in Section 721
to regulate Rails' interaction with any third party.192 Specifically, the September Order stated
that Rails' "shall not sell or otherwise transfer, or propose to sell or otherwise transfer, or
otherwise facilitate the sale or transfer of, any items made or otherwise produced by [Rails'
The
Chinese parent company] to any third party for use or installation at the Properties."'
the
Project
not
complete
a
sale
or
transfer
of
Order
went
on
to
say
"Rails
shall
September
Companies or their assets to any third party until," and then listed several requirements for
sale to any third party.' 94 Rails argued that Section 721 was drafted to address the issue of
assets leaving U.S. control, not assets entering U.S. control. While the President's actions
under the authority of Section 721 were exempt from judicial review, 95 any presidential
action that violates the constraints of the requirements of Section 721 cannot be granted the
judicial review exemption contemplated by Section 721. Ultimately, the crux of Rails
argument rested on the notion that restricting the interaction between Rails and American
parties is simply beyond the authority granted by Section 721.
In sum, the Court held that assessing the President's findings on the merits is simply
something the Court "cannot do."' 96
V. Timing

It remains to be seen if the September Order invoked Section 721 presidential power
within the statutory time limit. Rails failed to plead procedural errors and only raised the
merits of the September Order.'9
Under Section 721, the "[thirty]-day period beginning on the date of the acceptance
of written notice" began on June 28, 2012 and "shall be completed before the end of the
[thirty]-day period". ' Section 721 demands that the clock start running on June 28, 2012,
and not the day after acceptance of written notice; the outer limit of the Review would expire
on July 27, 2012.
However, Section 721 also demands that the Committee refrain from beginning an
Investigation at the end of a Review; rather, "the Committee shall immediately conduct an
[I]nvestigation" 99 when the Committee has found that there are national security risks.
Regardless of when the Review expired, the July Order issued on July 25, 2012 specifically

Id. at 60,282.
192

Id.

1

Id.

Id.
9 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (2011).
196 Rails Corp. v. Committec on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2012).
197 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10-1 1, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the
U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at 1 52; Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,
926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01 513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4931759, at 82.
'9 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(E) (2011).
'9 Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
1
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stated that "there are national security risks to the United States that arise as a result of the
Transaction."200
Assuming the Investigation began no earlier than the July Order's issuance date of
July 25, 2012, the forty-five day review period would have ended on September 10, 2012, at
the latest, because Section 721 provides that any Investigation "shall be completed before the
end of the [forty-five]-day period beginning on the date in which the [I]nvestigation
commenced. 22o
In turn, if the President decides to take action, "[t]he President shall announce the
decision on whether or not to take action . . . not later than fifteen days after the date on which
an [I]nvestigation . . . is completed." 202 If the Investigation began on July 25, 2012, when the
Committee announced national security risks related to Rails' transaction, then the
Investigation would have expired on September 10, 2012. Section 721 demands that the
President announce any action that will be taken within fifteen days after the end of an
Investigation. 203 Fifteen days after September 10, 2012 is September 26, 2012. In this case,
the September Order was issued on September 28, 2012. The time for the President to
announce the September Order under the authority of Section 721 should have lapsed earlier
the same week, rendering the September Order, procedurally, without Section 721 authority.
However, Rails failed to plead procedural error and only asked the Court to review
the September Order on its merits and as an offshoot of the Committee's questionable action,
rebutted in both the Original and the Amended Complaint. 204 Consequently, the Court did
not address any putative procedural error in the September Order.
CONCLUSION
As FDI continues to grow in the United States, CFIUS and the judicial system will
most likely have more interaction as more transactions are challenged. This interaction
between Committee and the judiciary should be welcomed, as broader case law will
ultimately serve to strengthen CFIUS by further articulating Section 721.

200

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,

926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at 44.
201 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(C) (2011).
202 Id. § 2170(d)(2).
203 Id.
20 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10-11, Rails Corp. v. Committce on Foreign Inv. in the

U.S., 926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4030646, at 1 52; Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Rails Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Inv. in the U.S.,
926 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-CV-01513-ABJ), 2012 WL 4931759, at 82.
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